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Social  security 
•  1n  the  Six 
Like  the  United  Kingdom,  the  EEC  countries  have  complex  systems  of protection  for 
their citizens against loss  or inadequacy of income. Predictable risks,  such as  ill-health  or old 
age,  are  covered  by social  insurance  schemes  for  most of the  population  in  these  countries, 
family  allowances  are  provided  for  all  those  with  a  specified  number of children,  and  each 
system  is  backed  up  by  meanstested  schemes  similar  to  Supplementary  Benefits  in  Britain. 
Welfare,  housing  and  education  services  also  play  an  important  part  in  these  systems  of 
social protection, so that  the  countries of the  EEC can  be  considered 'Welfare States'  in  the 
same way as can Britain. However, complete and adequate assistance  to the entire  population 
has  not come about  in  the  Six  any  more  than  it  has  in  the  United  Kingdom.  The  groups 
most in need of further protection may vary  from  country  to  country,  but no state  is without 
some continuing pockets of need. 
There  has  been  a  very  dramatic  increase  in  the  social 
services  of Britain and the EEC countries since  the Second 
World  War  and  especially  during  the  past  decade.  The 
earliest  legislation  came  at  very  different  times-for 
example,  Germany  introduced  some  compulsory  sickness 
insurance in 1883  while  Belgium did not do so until 1944-
but later developments  have  been  similar in all  the  coun-
tries.  They all had a  spate  of legislation  in the immediate 
post-war  period  and  have  extended  the  social  services  to 
ever-increasing  numbers  since  then.  There  has  also  been 
a substantial increase in the proportion of national resources 
which  is  devoted  to these  services,  an increase  which  has 
been  particularly  marked·  in  the 1960s.  By  1968,  the  pro-
portion  of national  income  spent  on social  security  alone 
had reached between 20  and 23  per cent in the EEC coun-
tries;  it was  somewhat lower in  Britain. 
These  post-war developments  have  been  very  similar  in 
all seven countries, and indeed in most of Western Europe. 
Each has been concerned to protect as  many of its  citizens 
as  possible  against loss  of income,  to  assist  with  the  cost 
of children and to ensure that all can benefit from medical 
care when necessary, but the similarities are greater between 
the countries  of the Six  themselves.  It is  then  possible  to 
speak  in  general  terms  about  social  services  in the  EEC, 
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provided that one  bears in mind that the countries are by 
no means uniform:  they each have their own  political and 
historical heritage and have developed their services accord-
ingly. The comparison is  most meaningful if it is  restricted 
to  social  security,  since  the  countries  vary rather more in 
their education and housing policies. 
Social security developed from earlier national insurance 
schemes  and  is  still  very  much  based  on  insurance  prin-
ciples.  However,  it does  extend  further  than  this,  and the 
term  means  different  things  in different  countries.  For the 
purpose  of  this  discussion,  it  has  been  defined  as  those 
services  which  provide  benefits,  usually  in  cash,  to  a 
substantial  proportion  of  the  population  and  without  a 
means-test.  Eligibility  is  determined  by  insurance  contri-
butions  or by  a  specified  burden,  such  as  children,  rather 
than  by  a  low  income.  Old  age  pensions,  sickness  benefit, 
family  allowances  and  unemployment  insurance  all  come 
into  this  definition  and  so,  in  the  EEC  countries,  does 
medical  care.  Housing,  education and welfare  services,  to-
gether with  cash allowances  of the Supplementary Benefits 
variety,  are  thus  excluded  from  this  discussion,  although 
they form an important part of the overall protection of the 
citizen. The nature of the risks covered and the post-war growth 
in provision  are similar in both  the  EEC and  the  United 
Kingdom,  but  the  services  themselves  show  substantial 
differences.  Perhaps  the  greatest  of  these  lies  in  the  role 
of the  central  government.  In  Britain,  it has  much direct 
responsibility,  employing  its  own  staff  in the  Department 
of Health and  Social  Security  to administer  the  services. 
In the  Six,  the  governments  exert  overall  control  but are 
less  inclined  to  play  a  direct  part in  the  administration. 
~h!-1~ in  Fran~, for  exampl~, social  security is  the  respon-
Sibi~ty of semi·au_tonomous msurance funds  which pay the 
nationaHy  prescnbed  benefits  and  collect  the  specified 
contributions.  Membership  of  a  particular  fund  depends 
on one's  occupation:  employees  in industry and commerce 
will  use  the  'General'  scheme,  while  those  in  agriculture 
will  use  anoher and the self-employed  one  of four  others. 
In the Federal Republic  of Germany, sickness  insurance is 
carried  out  by  some  two  thousand  funds  with  less  state 
control,  and  individuals  may  choose  with  whom  they  are 
to  insure.  This  is  very  different  from  the  British  system, 
where  there  is  a  single  national  scheme  covering  virtually 
the entire population. 
A  further  difference  is  ·that  provision is  less  uniform  in 
the  EEC countries than in Britain.  Coverage  of the  whole 
population  for  all  benefits  has  not  yet  been  achieved  in 
any  of  the  six  countries.  This  is  most  noticeable  in  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  where  higher-paid  white-
collar  workers  are  not compelled  by law  to insure  them-
selves  for  all  risks:  if  their  annual  incomes  exceeded 
£1,700  in  1970,  for example,  they  do  not take part in the 
sickness  insurance  programme.  There  may  also  be  some 
slight variations in the benefits  provided by different funds, 
despite the state's overall control; an example of this is the 
less  generous  family  allowance  provision  for  the  self-em-
ployed in France. In general, there is a greater emphasis on 
the  employed  worker  than  on  others,  as  these  were  the 
first  to  gain  protection  by  social  insurance;  compulsory 
contributions are easier to exact from those earning a wage 
or salary. Moreover, this emphasis is not entirely deliberate, 
being  in  part due  to  the  desires  of  the  self-employed  to 
remain  independent.  This  was  particularly  so  in  France, 
where  post-war plans  for a  uniform national system failed 
in the face  of opposition from  the 'independent workers' 1, 
a  numerically  greater  group  than  the  self-employed  in 
Britain. 
Table  1 
Social security: sources of finance  (per cent) 1968 
Country  Employer  Employee  State 
Belgium  50  23  27 
France  69  22  9 
Germany  49  31  20 
Italy  66  17  17 
Luxembourg  40  23  37 
Netherlands  46  39  15 
UK (1968-1969)  20  22  58 
Source:  "The  Common  Market  and  the  common  man" 
(EEC, May 1971). 
Coverage is, therefore, by no means as it is in the United 
1  Independent  workers  are  similar  to  the  "self-employed"  category 
in the  UK  and  are  mainly  composed  of small  farmers,  craftsmen  and 
shopkeepers. 
Kingdom. This is  both a  result and a cause of the financial 
arrangements  for social  security.  As  Table  1 shows,  in  no 
EEC country does the contribution of the central government 
reach  40  per  cent  of  the  total  cost  and,  taking  the  five 
largest countries only, the highest figure  is  37  per cent. The 
state's financial  role is  very much greater in  Britain, where 
the central  government bears  the  entire  cost of the  family 
all_owance  programme  and  contributes  approximately  one-
third  of the  cost  of the  other  cash  benefits,  moreover  its 
contribution to medical care, the costs of which fall  largely 
to  social  security  in  the  Six  is  something in  the  region  of 
90  per  cent  of the  total  National  Health  Service  budget. 
The  chief  sources  of finance  for  social  security  in  the 
EEC countries are thus  the  insured person  himself and the 
employers,  and  the  latter  are  the  more  important.  Their 
financial  burden  varies  from  country  to  country  but  is 
always  higher  than  that  of  their  British  counterparts.  In 
family  allowances,  for  example,  they  pay  a  substantial 
contribution in five  of the countries and indeed provide the 
entire financial  resources  for  this service in  France and the 
Netherlands.  Employers  bear  the  full  responsibility  for 
industrial injuries benefits in all six countries, unlike Britain 
where  an  employee  must  pay  an  insurance  contribution 
towards this. 
For  the  majority  of  citizens-those  in  employment-
these two aspects of social security may not be very impor-
tant.  The  emphasis  on  the  employed  worker and.  the  con-
sequent  lack  of  uniform  coverage  will  be:  of  greater 
importance  to others:  some  of the  wealthier self-employed 
workers may be pleased not to  be  included in the schemes, 
while those with smaller incomes may be adversely affected. 
Of  more  interest  to  the  average  citizen,  however,  are  his 
own  contributions.  These  tend  to  be  higher  in  the  EEC 
countries  than  in  Britain,  except  for  the  lowest-paid, 
because they  are earnings-related.  In the  United  Kingdom, 
there is  a  fiat-rate  contribution paid by everyone. It is  lar-
gest for the self-employed and smaller for women  than for 
men,  but  it  does  not  vary  with  income.  Above  that,  an 
earnings-related supplement is  paid by all except the lowest 
wage-earners.  In  the  EEC  countries,  contributions  are  a 
straight percentage  of earnings up to a  specified  maximum, 
and  there  is  no  fiat-rate  element.  The  low-paid  worker 
will  thus pay less  than his  British counterpart.  For others, 
however,  contributions are generally high by  British stand-
ards: even in France, where they are lower than in the other 
countries, an employee must contribute 6,25  per cent of his 
earnings  below  28  pounds  per week.  These figures  give  an 
indication of the size  of the contributions, but they should 
not be taken to be strictly comparable with those in Britain, 
since the costs and standards of living are not the same. 
Since  the  contributions  are  earnings-related,  benefits 
usually  follow  the  same  pa,ttern.  Some  of  the  countries 
guarantee  a  minimum  retirement pension,  but this-unlike 
the present British benefit-is not intended to be the norm. 
Others  .adhere  strictly  to  the  earnings-related  principle. 
The only benefits to be the same for all regardless of contri-
butions are medical  care,  which is  not a  cash  benefit,  and 
family  allowances,  to which  the  insured  person  does  not 
contribute.  There  is  thus  a  definite  link  between  earnings 
and  benefits  received.  A  well-paid  individual  may  find 
this  more satisfactory than the British system  but someone 
who  is  low-paid  may  find  his  benefit  very  inadequate. 
It is  interesting  to  note  here  that  the  British  system  has 
been  tending  towards  earnings-related  benefits  in  social 
security  in  the  past decade. 
For  the  citizen,  the  greatest  single  difference  in  social 
security provision between the United Kingdom and the Six 
is concerned with medical care. In all of the EEC countries, 
its  provision  is  linked,  to  a  greater  or lesser  extent,  with 
insurance. Those who have paid the required contributions 
may claim assistance with medical costs for themselves and 
their dependents.  In some  countries,  the  patient must find 
the  full  cost  himself  and  will  then  be  reimbursed  by  the insurance funds,  while in others he may be entitled to free 
treatment, but in either case the system is very different from 
the National Health Service with its virtually free treatment 
for  any  citizen  r~gardless  of  contributions.  This  will  be 
examined in more detail later. 
Thus the main features  of the social security systems in 
the EEC which mark them out as different from that used 
in Britain are the lesser degree of direct state involvement 
and,  especially,  the  lesser  reliance  on  central  government 
funds;  the lack of a  single national scheme and the exclu-
sion  of  certain  groups  from  some  benefits;  the  large 
employer contributions;  the  earnings-related  nature  of  the 
benefits  and contributions;  and the  insurance  basis  of the 
medical care scheme. The risks covered by the systems in all 
seven  countries are  broadly similar. Within the EEC itself 
however  there  are  many  smaller  differences,  since  each 
country has developed its social services in a purely nation-
al context. Some of these  differences  will  become apparent 
when the services are examined in more detail. 
There are four main groups  of social secunty provision 
which  will  now  be  considered,  old  age  insurance,  which 
normally includes survivors and disability benefits; sickness 
an~ maternity  insurance;  family  allowances;  and  unem-
ployment insurance. Industrial injuries protection also forms 
part of social security, but it will not be examined in detail 
since  it  is  less  complicated.  It is  an  employer-financed 
scheme paying medical costs and a pension where necessary 
to those suffering from an industrial injury or occupational 
disease.  Apart from  the  absence  of a  contribution  by the 
insured  person  himself,  it is  not  very  different  from  the 
British. system. 
Old age and related benefits 
Retirement pensions in the EEC are very closely  related 
to  contributions.  Not  only  are  they  earnings-related  but 
their  size  also  depends  on  the  number  of  contributions 
made.  In France  and  Italy,  a  minimum  of fifteen  years 
contributions  is  required  before any  benefit  (other  than  a 
small fiat-rate  one in France) may be  granted, and all the 
countries relate at least part of the pension to the number 
of years of insurance. Thus a man with thirty years contri-
butions may receive  a  pension  twice  as large as  that of a 
man insured for only fifteen years. If his income was twice 
as large as the other's during his working life, the difference 
between the two pensioners will  be even more pronounced. 
The  size  of  the  pension  varies  very  much  between  the 
countries.  In  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  it  can 
reach two-thirds  of previous  earnings,  although it is  more 
usually 40 or 50 per cent; in France, the maximum is 20 per 
cent. However, the latter country has institutionalised occu-
pational pensions schemes,  and these  now cover almost all 
employees  outside  agriculture  and  domestic  service.  In 
general,  therefore,  the  pensions  provided  by  these  social 
security schemes are larger than those in Britain, except for 
persons  with very low wages  or few  years  of contributing 
to  the scheme.  Some  of the countries  have  no guaranteed 
minimum pension and others provide this only on a means-
tested  basis,  and so hardship among the  elderly is  no less 
present in the Six than it is in the United Kingdom. 
All  the  countries  include  survivors  insurance  in  their 
retirement  pensions  schemes,  and  three  of  them  include 
disability insurance. The others  administer this  either sep-
arately or as part of the sickness insurance scheme. Benefits 
for survivors are related to the pension to which  the head 
of the family was  en~tled at the time of his death and are 
therefore  earnings-related  to  some  extent.  As  in  Britain, 
entitlement to benefit may depend on the age of the widow 
and  may  be  forfeited  on  remarriage.  Disability  pensions 
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are also earnings-related and may be varied according to the 
extent of the handicap. 
Sickness and maternity insurance 
An  insured  person  is  entitled  to  two  types  of  benefit: 
medical  care for  himself and his  de pen  dents  and an earn-
ings-related  sickness  benefit  for  himself if he  is  unable  to 
work.  It is  the  first  of these  which  is  most  interesting  to 
someone  accustomed  to  the  National  Health  Service.  In 
three of the countries, an individual can be treated wherever 
he wishes but must bear the full cost himself; the insurance 
fund will later reimburse some or all of the amount to him 
according  to a  fixed  scale.  This  reimbursement may  be as 
low  as  70  or 75  per cent  in  France  and  Belgium.  In  the 
Netherlands  and the  Federal  Republic  of Germany,  treat-
ment can  be  obtained  only  from  those  doctors  registered 
with  the insurance fund,  but the  patient does  not have  to 
pay.  In these two countries, therefore,  the system is  nearer 
to  that  used  in  Britain,  but  it  is  still  strictly  related  to 
insurance.  Where  a  system  of partial reimbursement  oper-
reimbursement and means-tested  assistance  may  be availa-
ble  for  the  poorest.  This  is  very  similar to the exemption 
system for prescription charges in Britain. 
Maternity benefit is  similar, in that the dependents of an 
insured  person  are  entitled  to  treatment  and  a  woman 
insured  in  her  own  right  is  also  entitled  to  an earnings-
related cash  benefit  during  her absence  from  work.  Treat-
ment  is  available  under  the  same  conditions  as  that  for 
illness, except in France, where it is free  of charge.  Mater-
nity  grants  are  also  paid  in  four  of  the  countries,  being 
included in  the family  allowance  scheme  in three of these. 
Their level  is  generally higher than that of the equivalent 
British  benefit:  for  example,  it is  approximately fifty-eight 
pounds in France. 
The provision of medical care in the EEC is  thus substan-
tially  different  from  that in  the  United  Kingdom.  Partic-
uraly in the countries  operating the reimbursement system, 
there is greater freedom of choice in that the patient can go 
to  whichever  doctor  he  wishes  without  being  registered. 
He  can  also  choose  his  treatment  to  a  certain  extent, 
although anything costing more than the prescribed amount 
will  not be reimbursed in full.  However, if he cannot find 
the  initial  payment,  he  may  be  disinclined  to  seek 
treatment,  and  the  greater  independence  of  the  doctors 
can  lead  to  difficulties  in  planning  the  service.  The 
costs  in each country cause as  much concern  as do those 
of the  National  Health Service  and contributions  must be 
high  to meet  these.  Even  in  France,  with  its  large  direct 
charges, the contribution of the insured individual is 3,5  per 
cent of earnings up to 28  pounds per week. 
Family allowances 
With the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the  EEC countries  lay  greater  emphasis  on  these  benefits 
than  does  Britain.  In  four  of the  countries,  an allowance 
is  paid  automatically  for  the  first  child  and  this  also 
happens in France if the mother does not go  out to work. 
Benefits tend to be larger than in Britain, for example, nine 
pounds  per  month  for  the  second  child  in  Belgium  and 
eleven  pounds  for  the  third  and  fourth  child  in  France, 
although  here  again  one must  bear in  mind  that costs  of 
living are not the same in each country. Additional benefits 
and services are provided in some of the countries, such as 
an extra allowance for handicapped children in Belgium and 
Luxembourg.  France  has  the  greatest  number  of  these additional  benefits,  ranging  from  housing  and  prenatal 
allowances to welfare services. 
The one exception to this pattern of substantial provision 
for  the  family,  financed  almost  entirely  by  employers,  is 
the Federal Republic of Germany. The system used there is 
very  much closer  to  that in  Britain:  entirely  financed  out 
of taxation, it provides  benefit from the second child only. 
For  this  child,  the  allowance  is  only  three  pounds·  per 
month, but it is  substantially larger for subsequent children. 
Unlike  the British system,  automatic entitlement to benefit 
comes  only  with  the  third  child  and  only  those  with  low 
incomes  may  receive  an  allowance  for  the  second,  but it 
may be paid for longer than the  British benefit:  up to age 
eighteen normally and 25  in certain circumstances. 
Unemployment insurance 
There is  no great similarity between the countries of the 
EEC in their provision for unemployment, except that they 
have  traditionally  placed  less  emphasis  on  it  than  have 
British  governments.  Neither France  nor Luxembourg  has 
a  statutory  unemployment insurance  programme,  although 
France  has  occupational  provision  for  the  majority  of 
employed  workers.  These  two  countries  provided  flat-rate 
benefits  to  the  unemployed,  with  a  means-test  in  some 
circumstances.  Belgium  also  grants  fairly  standardised 
benefits, but the remaining three countries pay earnings-relat-
ed allowances. All six, like Britain, demand of the recipient 
that he  be  prepared  to take  suitable  employment,  and all 
except  Belgium  set  a  limit  on  the  length  of  time  during 
which benefit may be  paid. 
Social security provision in the Six thus has broad simila-
rities, but the details of the services are varied, each country 
has  developed  its  own  system  over a  long period  of time 
to meet its  own  particular  needs.  Although  the  Treaty  of 
Rome  makes  provision  for  the  countries  to  'harmonise' 
their social services, progress has been slow in this direction. 
Certain  agreements  have  been  made  with  regard  to  the 
contributions  and  benefits  of  migrant  workers,  but  these 
have  been  essentially  administrative:  they  have  not altered 
the  pattern  of provision.  The expenditure  patterns  of the 
different  countries  have,  however,  come  somewhat  closer 
together in recent years so that some of the differences are 
being  modified.  Thus  the  traditional  French  emphasis  on 
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family  allowances  has  been  lessened  in favour of old  age 
pensions,  while  the  reverse  has  happened  in  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany.  The  overall  expenditure  on  social 
security has also come closer together in recent years,  but 
this  may be  for reasons  unconnected with the existence  of 
the  EEC.  Any  substantial  increases  in  similarity  between 
the  services  of the  different countries seem unlikely in  the 
near future. 
Despite the existence of these differences, it remains clear 
that  the  social  security  systems  of  the  Six  share  certain 
features not found in Britain. The less direct role of govern-
ment in both administration and finance  is  the  most signi-
ficant of these, but for the average citizen the contributions 
and  benefits  are  more important.  The relation  to earnings 
and the frequently higher contributions provide more gene-
rous  benefits  than  in  Britain  for  those  with  average  and 
above-average  incomes,  but the  lowest-paid  may  be  in  an 
unsatisfactory position. The medical care systems are more 
complex, since a patient's insurance entitlement must always 
be  investigated  and  there  is  less  control  over  GPs  and 
hospitals.  In the countries  operating a  reimbursement sys-
tem, treatment is  more expensive for the patient, especially 
in  the  short  term.  In  general,  it may  be  said  that  social 
security  in  the  EEC caters  for  the  average  citizen  with  a 
reasonable  income  and  not  for  the  poorer  members  of 
society. Family allowances are usually flat-rate and tax-free, 
other  benefits  reflect  previous  earnings,  medical  provision 
works on the assumption that the patient can afford to bear 
part  of  the  cost  himself.  Those  with  exceptionally  low 
incomes  are catered for outside  the social security system. 
Although  many  of Britain's  means-tested  benefits  are  also 
outside social security as  it is  here defined, she  still covers 
lower-paid  workers  more  fully  by  insurance,  with  the 
emphasis  on flat-rate  benefits  and free  medical care.  How-
ever, this pattern is changing slightly and Britain is adopting 
certain EEC features,  such as  earnings-related  benefit~ and 
charges in medical care. 
Further reading 
Comparative  tables  of the  Social  Security  Systems  in  the 
EEC,  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  July 
1971. European  Studies,  14,  1972 
Women  at work 
in  the Common  .Market 
In the European Community, as  in  Britain,  women make· up about a third of the labour 
force though the proportion varies from country to country. Except in  the Netherlands, most of 
them are  married.  They  make their  greatest  contribution  in  the  service  sector.  Although  the 
Rome Treaty  requires  equal  pay  for  like  work,  women  workers  tend  to  be  concentrated  in 
unskilled occupations and their earnings remain well below those of men. They are  the subject 
of a substantia!  body of protective legislation-not yet harmonised among  the  Six-some of 
which would seem outdated and undesirably discriminatory  in  its effect. 
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome 
Women  workers  in  the  Community  enjoy  in  theory  at 
least  an  advantage  over  their  British  counterparts:  article 
119 of the Rome Treaty required each state to ensure in the 
course  of  the  first  stage,  i.e.  between  1958  and  1961, 
and  subsequently  to  maintain,  the  application  of  the 
principle  of  equal  remuneration  for  equal  work  between 
men  and women.  Under current legislation equal pay will 
become law in the  United Kingdom only in 1975.  In prac-
tice,  however,  are women  so much  better  off  in the Com-
munity  than  they  are  in  Britain?  The  Rome  Treaty  may 
have got them equal pay for doing the same work as men; 
but has it changed attitudes to the  part that women  could 
and  should  play  outside  the  home:  have  girls  as  free  a 
choice of career as  boys;  are some  occupations  still barred 
to  women,  either formally  or  by  custom  and practice;  do 
women  now  have  the  same  opportunities  as  men  to  train 
for  manual  and  intellectual  skills;  can  they  compete  on 
equal  terms  for  top  jobs;  and  not  least  important,  have 
women in the  Community reappraised  their  own  potential 
worth  to  the  labour  market?  Equal  pay  without  equal 
opportunity is  a miserable prize, hardly worth the winning; 
but  equal  opportunities  have  to  be  actively  exploited. 
Clearly  time  is  needed  to  break  the  near  monopoly  of 
political  and economic  skills  that  men  have  built  up  for 
themselves  over  the  past  two  centuries;  that  the  progress 
of the Community's women to date is  somewhat limited is 
indicated  by  the  fact  that,  if  interpreters  are  excluded, 
there is  no woman  in either of the  top two grades  of the 
Commission's  civil  service  in  Brussels.  Women  account 
for  only 5 per cent of all grade A  officers,  and 49  out of 
a  total  of  77  are  in  the  two  lowest  grades  (A6  and  7, 
where  they  make up  14  per cent of the  total);  only  3 are 
in  A3  out of a  grade total  of 270. 
Article  119  had  a  very  limited  aim,  but  even  so  its 
initial impact was small; it did little to reinforce the appli-
cation of a  principle already enshrined in the constitutions 
of  France,  Italy  and  Germany  or  to  induce  the  Benelux 
countries  to  revise  their  customary  practices.  In  1961, 
therefore,  its  meaning  was  more  precisely  spelt  out  and 
brought  into  line  with  the  International  Labour  Office 
convention 100, already ratified by four of the Six (and now 
ratified by all but the Netherlands); this calls for equal pay 
for work of equal value.  At the same time it was stipulated 
that differentials between men's and women's pay should be 
reduced to 15  per cent by June 1962;  to 10 per cent a year 
later  and  eliminated  by  December  1964.  A  Commission 
Survey,  published  last  year  and  relating  to  end  1968, 
reported  progress,  but noted  that member states  were  still 
1 
far from  having completely respected  all  the commitments 
entered  upon.  In  all  countries  except  the  Netherlands,  a 
woman, who feels  that she is  being discriminated against in 
respect of pay on grounds of sex alone can bring an action 
in the courts, and there has been a  substantial reduction in 
instances  of  direct  sex  discrimination  in  collective  agree-
ments  throughout  the  Six  (it  still  exists,  for  example,  in 
dairies  and  cheesemongeries  in  Belgium,  in  the  German 
leather  industry  and  widely  in  the  Netherlands);  but  the 
Commission  deplores  the continued absence  of such agree-
ments  in  a  number  of industrial  sectors  and geographical 
regions  in  every  country,  particularly  in  distribution  and 
the  service  industries  and  in  small  businesses.  It is  also 
fully alive to the fact that an apparently non-discriminatory 
collective  agreements  does  not  guarantee  a  woman  the 
same treatment as a man. For example, only in Holland are 
the rates set in such agreements  roughly the same as  those 
actually  paid;  elsewhere  agreed  rates  are  minima,  each 
firm  negotiating actual pay scales.  Again,  the  outlawing of 
the  category 'women's work' has  solved no problems:  such 
work has been rechristened 'light' in Germany,  'simple' or 
'light' in Italy, 'asexual' in  Belgium;  it remains ill-paid and 
is  undertaken  only  by  women.  Yet  again,  in  evaluating 
jobs male attributes such as  strength are rated more highly 
than female  ones,  such as  dexterity;  France is  criticised on 
thjs  count;  the  Netherlands,  on  the  other  hand,  is  com-
mended  for  having  a  very  fair  system  of job  evaluation. 
Thus,  despite  the  Common  Market's  13  years,  it  is 
impossible  to  generalise  to  any  great  extent  about  the 
position  of working  women  in  the  Six,  let alone  to make 
confident  comparisons  between  their  status  and  that  of 
British  women  workers;  each  country  tends  to  maintain 
its traditional ideas  of woman's place in society,  modifying 
long-standing practices only slowly and reluctantly. 
The following  outlines the part played by women in the 
Community's labour force and the special legislation that is 
applied to them as  workers. To examine why they play the 
role  they  do,  and  to  explore  ways  in  which  the  labour 
market  might  be  unified-either  on  a  geographical  or on 
a  sex  basis-would  require  a  separate  volume  on  each 
country. 
A profile of women at work in the Community 1 
In Germany and France, as in Britain, about 40 per cent 
of women  of 14  years  and  over  are at work;  in  Belgium 
1  The statistics used  in  this  article are taken in the  main  from  two 
Community documents (L'emploi des  femmes  et ses  problemes dans  les 
hats membres de  la  CEE,  rapport de  Mrme  E.  Sullerot, July  1970;  and 
Rapport  de  la  Commission  au  Conseil  sur  l'etat  d'application  au 
31  decembre  1968  du  principe  d'egalite  entre  renumerations  masculines about 30  per cent;  but in Italy and the  Netherlands  only 
about a  quarter. If the  over  65s  as  well  as  the  under  14s 
are  eliminated  the  proposition  rises  to  not far  short  of a 
half in France  but remains  at 26  per cent in  the  Nether-
lands.  Most  women  workers  are  married;  the  proportion 
ranges  from  62  per  cent  in  Belgium  to  28  per  cent  in 
Holland and is  something  over 55  per cent in Britain  and 
France. In all countries except Belgium there are substantial 
regional  differences  in activity rates.  In Britain the highest 
proportions  are  found  in  a  diagonal  belt  of industrialised 
country  running  from  the  South-East  through  the  West 
In  West  Germany,  France  and  Great  Britain  women 
form  rather more  than  a  third  of the  active  population, 
but in Italy and Belgium they represent only 27-28 per cent 
and in the Netherlands under a quarter. Their status within 
the labour force  varies  a  good deal  both within  the Com-
munity and between Britain and the Community. In Britain 
the vast  majority are employees;  self-employed  and family 
helpers  account  for  only  4  per  cent  of the  total.  In  the 
Community, however, family helpers play a substantial role, 
particularly  in  Italy,  and  self-employed  women  are  very 
West  I  I  Germany  France  Italy  I  Belgfum I  N~:-1  ~~ 
Working  women,  1968  - million 
of whom: 
self-employed  % 
employees  % 
family  helpers  % 
Women as  a  proportion of the 
working  population  % 
Activity rates among women of 14 
years and over % 
Proportion  of working  women 
who  are married  % 
Midlands to the North-West; the lowest, in the agricultural 
areas  of  the  South-West  and  East-Anglia.  In  the  Com-
munity, however there is  no such close correlation between 
industrialisation  and  women's  activity  rates;  Berlin  and 
Paris,  it is  true,  have  the  highest  rates  in  the  Six-with 
more than half of all women in the appropriate age groups 
working-but in  the  Rome  region  the  proportion is  under 
a  quarter and in north-west Italy between  a  quarter and a 
third.  Against  this  this  agricultural  areas  of  west  and 
central France boast among the  highest rates.  In the  14-19 
age  group about the same proportion of boys  and girls are 
at work;  but whereas  most men  between  20  and 60  work, 
among women  the  activity  rate  is  highest  in  the  20  to  24 
age  group,  falling  sharply  in  the  next  quinquennium  and 
remaining  low  until  the  40's  when  there  is  usually  some 
recovery before a renewed decline in the 50's  and 60's. 
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important in  Italy  and  Belgium  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in 
France  and  West  Germany.  Most  of these  self-employed 
women  are,  in  fact,  small  farmers-sometimes  widows 
sometimes  wives  whose  husbands  have  left  the  land  fo; 
more  profitable  work  in  the  factories.  Throughout  the 
Community  women  provide  a  greater  proportion  of  all 
workers  in  agriculture  than  they  do  of paid  workers-in 
Germany they account for more than half of all agricultural 
workers,  only about a  quarter of paid agricultural workers. 
In  Britain  the  opposite  is  the  case.  In  other  sectors  the 
self-employed  and  family  helpers  are  less  important,  and 
women  account  for  roughly  the  same  proportions  of all 
workers as  of paid workers. Their contribution to the work 
force  is  greater in the  service  industries,  where  in Britain, 
France and Germany they make up over 40 per cent of the 
Women's part in  the  labour force:  proportion of all 
workers/employees (per cent) 
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Agriculture  52  26  34  15  31 
Industry  24  28  24  24  21 
Services  42  41  48  48  31 
Total  34  31  37  36  47 
et jeminines,  June 1970)  and  were  collected  by the  Community's statis-
tical  office  on  a  broadly  comparable  basis;  the  UK  figures  are  those 
published  by  the Department of Employment.  The  intention  is  to  give 
a  broad picture of the  position at the end  of 1960s;  the importance of 
minor  differences  should  not  be  over-rated,  and margins  of error  may 
be  fairly  substantial. 
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total, in  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  more than  a  third; 
in Italy, however, their share amounts to only  30  per cent. 
In industry  they  are  least  well  represented  in the  Nether-
lands  (only  14  per cent  of the  work  force),  while  in  the 
major countries they contribute about a  quarter. DISTRIBUTION  OF  SKILLED, SEMI-SKILLED  AND  OTHER 
WORKERS  IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN THE  COUNTRIES 
OF  THE  E.E.C.  (1968) : PROPORTION OF MEN AND W.OMEN 
BELGIUM 
Skilled 
Semi-skilled ~ 
Others 
GERMANY 
Skilled 
Semi-skilled 
Others 
FRANCE 
Skilled 
Semi-skilled 
Others 
ITALY 
Skilled 
Semi-skilled 
Others 
LUXEMBOURG 
Skilled 
&iQ4AWW41 
Semi-skilled  111 
Others 
NETHERLANDS 
Skilled 
Semi-skilled 
Others 
4.1  °/o 
6.8 °/o 
14.8 °/o 
1.6 °/o 
12.3 °/o 
15.9 °/o 
3.6 °/o 
13.1 °/o 
12.6 °/o 
5.6 °/o 
12.2 °/o 
12.9 °/o 
0.2 °/o 
1.6 °/o 
4.1  °/o 
2.0 °/o 
7.3 °/o 
7.5 °/o 
- Proportion men 
fii.fr>:';.,;,;l  Proportion women 
27.3 °/o 
22.2 °/o 
24.8 °/o 
34.7 °/o 
24.2 °/o 
11.5 °/o 
31.7 °/o 
23.4 °/o 
15.6 °/o 
30.7 °/o 
25.5 °/o 
13.2 °/o 
32.6 °/o 
27.5 °/o 
34.0 °/o 
32.0 °/o 
31.0 °/o 
20.2 °/o 
Average hourly wage of women 
in manufacturing as proportion 
of men's wage 
68.1 °/o 
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75.2 °/o 
54.5 °/o 
60.7 °/o The service industries, to which women make such a big 
contribution, in their turn provide women with the greatest 
employment  opportunities:  they  employ  over  70  per cent 
of all women workers in the Netherlands, about two-thirds 
of those in the  United Kingdom, France and Belgium, and 
about  half  in  Germany.  Agriculture  is  an  important 
employer  in  France,  Germany  and  Italy,  but negligible  in 
the Low Countries and the  UK. Industry takes the highest 
proportion  of  women  employees  in  Italy,  followed  by 
Germany,  with  France  and  Britain  next  and  the  Nether-
lands well  behind all the rest 
Within  the  manufacturing  industry,  women  are  heavily 
concentrated in a few  sectors and in the lowest grades: they 
remain  as  they  always  have  been,  a  major element in  the 
textile  and  clothing  industries,  although  in  Britain  the 
introduction  of sophisticated  machinery  is  depriving  them 
of  some  of  their  traditional  jobs,  particularly  in  cotton 
textiles.  For  the  rest,  they  are  mainly  in  work  that  has 
never  involved  heavy  physical  labour,  that  requires  little 
training,  or that demands  manual  dexterity,  such  as  elec-
tronic  engineering.  Within  these  broad  groupings,  custom 
and practice lay down that some work is  for men other for 
women, often  on a  wholly  irrational basis  and varying not 
only  between  countries  but quite  locally  within  countries. 
in manufacturing are skilled, but in France and the Nether-
lands  the  figure  is  only  12  per  cent  and  in  Germany  a 
mere 5 per cent; unskilled workers make up more than half 
the  total  female  labour force  in manufacturing in Belgium 
and Germany and nearly 70  per cent in Luxembourg.  Only 
in  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  are  more  than  a  third  of 
men  in manufacturing classed as unskilled. 
In  the  service  sector  the  separation  into  men's  and 
women's  work  is  no  less  pronounced:  in  all  countries 
domestic, personal and welfare services are overwhelmingly 
female  preserves,  though  with  characteristic  national  dis-
tinctions:  for example,  restaurant workers  in  Germany are 
mainly  women,  in  Italy  mainly  men.  In  the  professions, 
teaching is  predominantly a  man's job in Germany and the 
Netherlands, a woman's in France and Belgium,  as it is  in 
the United Kingdom.  In Germany most furriers,  in France 
most  pharmacists  are  women.  Women  have  done  better 
in the legal profession in France than they have in the rest 
of the Six  or in  Britain;  on  the other hand there are more 
women  doctors in  the  UK than there  are  in  France, Ger-
many or Italy. In no Western European country do women 
engineers  approach  the  importance  that  they  have  in  the 
USSR:  in France, which makes the best showing, even now 
fewer  than 4 per cent of all engineers are women. 
Distribution  of the  female  labour force  (per  cent) 
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In general, a  third or slightly more of all manufacturing 
workers  in  the  Six  are  skilled  and  roughly  another  third 
semi-skilled,  but as  the enclosed chart shows  women  make 
up a near negligible fraction  of the total. It is claimed that 
in  Italy 18  per cent and in  Belgium  16  per cent of women 
Women employees as a  proportion of all  employees 
in certain major manufacturing and service industries 
(per cent) 
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Although in  general women  probably have easier access 
to training in  the  service  sector than  they  do in industry, 
they  are  still  concentrated  in  the  lower  paid  occupations 
and except in women's professions hold very few  top jobs. 
No  statistical  comparison  of  men's  and  women's  pay  is 
possible  in this  sector;  but the Commission  has  attempted 
to compare the average hourly earnings of men and women 
in manufacturing. Although the figures  are not very up-to-
date  and are very  general  they  serve  to illustrate  the very 
secondary position occupied by women. 
Protective-and discriminatory?-legislation 
Some  of women's  difficulties  in  the  labour market  vis-
a-vis men lie in legislation which enshrines real or supposed 
differences between the sexes;  but some lie in the failure to 
acknowledge  that  men's  and  women's  life  patterns  are 
different-and that women have changed very substantially 
and are still  changing.  Today's labour market is  organised 
by  men  for  men,  and  employers  continue  to  claim  that 
female  labour  is  less  flexible,  less  trainable,  less  reliable 
and more costly to organise than is  male labour. 
The legislation can be  divided into two groups:  that cen-
tering  round childbearing  and  that  which  stems  from  the 
image of woman  as  something frailer and less  than a  man. 
All  the  Community countries  protect the  working  mother, 
but each  in  its  own  way.  In  general  work  prejudicial  to 
health  (variously defined)  is  forbidden  to  pregnant women 
and  nursing  mothers;  and  expectant  mothers  may  not be 
forced  to  work  for  a  period  varying  from  three  months Average hourly wage of workers in  manufacturing 
(per cent) 
Rate of Increase 
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Germany  13.9  17.3  9.5  8.8  24.7  27.8  -26.8  -25.6  -21.8  -30.3 a 
France  12.3  11.3  22.1  24.7  37.1  38.7  -25.8  -19.4  -15.6  -27.5 a 
Italy  10.9  12.6  9.8  10.0  21.7  23.8  -29.4  -24.0  - 9.1  -24.8 
Belgium  18.9  21.8  11.5  12.1  32.6  36.5  -33.2  -28.7  -25.0  -31.9 
Netherlands  18.8  24.2  17.0  20.5  38.9  49.7  -40.1  -39.9  -31.3  -39.3 
a  The  apparent  anomaly  by  the  average  being  higher  than  the  individual  groups  is  ·explained  by  the  fact 
that  women  workers  are  concentrated  in  the  unsklilled  group  while  men  dominate  the  skilled  and  semi-skilled 
groups. 
(in  Italian industry) to four weeks  (Germany) before child-
birth-though in Holland there is  no  obligatory  pre-natal 
holiday. The mother is usually accorded a 4-6 week holiday 
after  a  birth,  and  in  Italy  this  can  be  prolonged  to  6 
months  without any  loss  of seniority  rights.  Women  may 
not  be  sacked  during  pregnancy  in  France,  Germany  or 
Italy, or for one month after a  birth in Belgium, 4 months 
in  Germany,  or until  the  child  is  a  year  old in  Italy.  In 
the  Netherlands,  on the other hand, a  work contract may, 
without offence,  specify  pregnancy as  a  grounds  for termi-
nation of appointment. In Germany sickness-insured women 
on maternity leave  get a  maternity allocation  in  lieu  of a 
salary,  based  on  average  pay  over  the  last  3  months;  in 
Belgium they get approximately 60 per cent of their normal 
pay; in  France they get 0.5  normal pay from social insur-
ance  (two-thirds if they have  3 or more children);  in Italy 
they get about 80 per cent.  But maternity leave over, work-
ing  mothers sink to being  the least privileged  members  of 
the  labour force;  their  chances  of getting ·a good  job,  of 
being  trained,  or being  in  line  for  promotion  are  all  less-
ened,  while  they run the risk  of being  the first  to get  the 
sack if activity  slackens. It is  assumed that their children's 
needs will have priority over their employer's. Like Britain, 
the  Six  have  hardly  touched  the  problem  of the  care  of 
the  pre-school  age  child;  creches  and  kindergarten  (some 
state run, some private, some provided by employers) cater 
for only a  fraction  of the under-sixes.  And not much has 
been done to align school and working hours and holidays. 
Other labour legislation applying specifically to women is 
often  antiquated-some dating  back to  1914--and frankly 
discriminatory in barring them from ever qualifying for the 
highest pay scales. In Belgium a married woman must have 
her husband's  permission  to work,  and women  are  barred 
from  certain  branches of public  administration,  e.g.  in the 
ministry  of  finance  in  the  Netherlands,  marriage  is  a 
permissible grounds for dismissal. Elsewhere, however, such 
illiberal  legislation  has  been  repealed;  but the  heavy  and 
unhealthy work that is  generally barred to  women has not 
been  redefined  in  terms  of  modem  industrial  techniques. 
Hours that may be worked-in total, at a stretch, at certain 
times  of day-are always  restricted,  though  not always  in 
the same way.  Overtime is variously defined and night-work 
(forbidden  to  women  in  industry)  takes  place  between 
6.00  p.m.  and  7.00  a.m.  in  the  Netherlands,  between 
10.00 p.m. and 5.00 a.m. in France, Italy and Luxembourg; 
Belgium  more  rationally  forbids  men  or women  to  work 
between  10.00  p.m.  and  6.00  a.m.  except  in  certain  listed 
occupations. 
As in the United Kingdom, so women in the Community 
retire earlier than men and get lower pensions; and although 
taxation  of  single  women  is  non-discriminatory,  that  of 
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married women is  not designed to encourage them to work 
and  in  many  cases,  particularly  those  of  highly  qualified 
women,  inhibits  them  from  doing  so.  Only  in  Germany 
can a married woman choose between a  joint or a  separate 
assessment; in France and Luxembourg husband and wife's 
income must be accumulated; in Italy some taxes are levied 
on the separate incomes, some on the  joint income;  in the 
Netherlands  a  wife  gets  a  tax-free  allowance  of one third 
of her income,  the rest is  accumulated;  in  Belgium,  too, a 
mixed system exists. 
What's to be done 
Clearly women at work in the Community, as in Britain, 
continue  to  suffer  a  number  of  disadvantages  compared 
with men.  Some of them can be removed by legislation but 
most  of them  are  so  deep  rooted  in  the  traditional  view 
of woman's place in society that they can only be eliminated 
gradually  by  modifying  the  attitude  of  society  towards 
women  and  of women  towards  themselves.  It is  vital that 
women should realise the implications that changing demo-
graphic  trends  hold  for  their  life  patterns:  younger  mar-
riages, fewer children, borne over a shorter timespan, mean 
that  in  future  a  woman  can  expect  to  have  a  working 
life  of some  30  years  after her family  has  reached  school 
age.  To  make  full  use  of  this  she  must  be  prepared  to 
train,  to accept  responsibility,  to  take  decisions  about her 
own  future  and  to  play  an  active  part  in  organisations 
where wages  and conditions of work are decided, e.g.  trade 
unions,  in  order to .ensure  that newer  techniques  (such  as 
job evaluation) are not misused and women are not fobbed 
off with eQuality of pay and opportunity on paper, continu-
ed  discrimination in practice. 
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The  West  European  shipbuilding  industry  has  expanded  quite  substantially  during  the 
last decade,  yet the larger it grows the greater are  the losses it makes. The cause of the  losses 
is  the  remarkable  competitive  ability  of Japan  and  the  reason  for  continued  existence  is 
largely  social-governments are  not prepared  to  face  the  heavy  unemployment that  closure 
would  bring. 
Shipbuilding is very largely  the province of the industrial maritime countries of the  world 
for they possess not only the requisite technology to construct steel ships, but also  the demand 
for  vessels  in  order  to  pursue  international  trade  by  sea.  In  1970  the  industry  was  highly 
concentrated into two regions of the  world, Japan,  with 48  per cent of the tonnage  launched, 
and Western  Europe,  responsible  for  41  per  cent of the  total.  The  USA  made only  a  small 
contribution,  amounting to  1.5  per cent,  for  shipbuilding is a  large  user  of man  power  and 
America's  high  level  of wages  makes  it  difficult  to  build  ships  at competitive  prices.  This 
contrasts  with  the  situation  in  the  early  nineteenth  century  when  New  England  was  the 
world's  leading  producer  of wooden  vessels.  The  switch  to  steam-powered,  iron  ships  that 
took  place  in  mid-nineteenth  century  gave  Britain  a  great  locational  advantage  and  the 
American industry  declined.  British  iron  manufacture and steam  power  technology  were  the 
most advanced  in  the  world,  and in  addition  Britain  possessed  two coastal  coalfields  where 
iron  production and heavy engineering were  well developed.  These  two  areas,  Clydeside  and 
Tyneside,  alone  launched  three-quarters  of the  world  tonnage  during  the  1890's  and  Britain 
could  claim  between  80  and  90  per  cent of the  world  total.  The  inter-war  period  saw  the 
emergence  of yards  in  Western  Europe  and  in  the  late  1930's  Britain's  share  had  fallen  to 
35-40  per cent of the  world's output.  The  last  two  decades  have  seen  a  dramatic  change  in 
emphasis  from  Western  Europe  to  Japan  who  produced  no  ships  at  all  in  1950  and  yet 
had overtaken Britain  by  1956. 
European  Studies,  14,  1972 
It is  the paradox of shipbuilding in Western Europe that 
continued expansion has not resulted in prosperity and that 
losses have not led to contraction. As  the demand for large 
ships  has  grown,  yards  have  appropriately  expanded  their 
facilities  and  when  profits  have  not  been  forthcoming, 
yards have been kept open by the injection of governments 
funds  ·to  prevent  hc=avy  localised  unemployment.  This 
situation is  as  true of the  EEC countries as  it is  of Great 
Britain and of Sweden where productivity is  the highest in 
Western  Europe.  The  ability  of  Japan  to  produce  ships 
at prices substantially lower than can be achieved in West-
em Europe is the root of the problem. The Geddes Report 
of 1966,  reported that British  dry cargo bulk carriers were 
equal  in  price  to  those  built  in  Europe,  but  they  were 
between  7.5  and  15  per  cent  above  Japanese  prices,  and 
that  British  tankers,  while  being  more  costly  than  the 
European  vessel,  were  between  15  and  20  per  cent  more 
expensive  than  those  built in Japan.  Since  Japanese  yards 
now  have  sufficient  capacity  to  meet  the  entire  world 
demand,  it  is  clear  that  European  yards  have  effectively 
become  mere  instruments  of  governmental  social  policy. 
Indeed,  in  January  1972  an  OEcD  report  put  forward 
proposals  for  the  restriction  of  further  construction  of 
shipbuilding  facilities.  Support  for  existing  capacity  can 
perhaps be justified, but the case  for subsidising expansion 
is  not weighty. 
Table 1 
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Merchant  Vessels  launched  in  Western  Europe  and Japan 
'000 Tons 
1953  1960  1970 
Japan  557  1,732  10,475 
Sweden  485  711  1,711 
West 
Germany  818  1,092  1,687 
Great Britain  1,317  1,331  1,237 
France  235  594  960 
Spain  46  161  926 
Norway  118  198  639 
Italy  263  434  598 
Denmark  142  219  514 
Netherlands  341  567  460 
Belgium  61  130  155 
World  5,095  8,356  21,689 
The  cause  of  the  price  differential  between  Japan  and 
Western  Europe  may  be  examined  under  four  headings. 1.  Labour costs.  Despite the introduction of labour sav-
ing methods as the pre-fabrication of assemblies, it has not 
proved possible to mass produce large numbers of identical 
ships  and  the  industry  has  remained  an intentive  user  of 
labour.  Wage  bills  account for  15-20  per cent of the cost 
of an average ship in Western Europe, but in a  high wage 
economy  like  the  USA  the  percentage  is  about  40,  thus 
explaining the unimportance of the industry in that country. 
It was  hoped that increases in the size of ship would bring 
economies in labour needs,  but it has been discovered that 
for tankers of more than 133,000 tons, labour requirements 
per ton of vessel actually increase,  so  that the  really large 
tankers  can  be  produced  most  cheaply  in  areas  of  low 
wages.  In  the  mid-1950's  Japan  was  an  exceptionally  low 
labour cost economy, with hourly wages between one quar-
ter  and  one  third those  of the  EEC countries.  Since  then 
Japenese  wages  have  increased  quite  markedly,  but it  is 
not the  hourly wage  that is  critical,  it is  the  productivity 
of labour that is  the vital  consideration.  The  British  case 
highlights  the  problem.  Not  only  is  management  conser-
vative,  but  also  the  existence  of  several  craft  unions 
creates  demarcation  disputes  and  low  productivity,  giving 
rise to low profits and an inability to buy new equipment. 
The principal unions are the Amalgamated Union of Engi-
neering Workers, the Electrical Trades Union, the Transport 
and  General  Workers  Union,  the  Associated  Society  of 
Boilermakers  and  Shipwrights  and  the  Union  of  Con-
struction, Allied Trades  &  Technicians.  Between  1960  and 
1964,  1,457  days per 1,000 workers were lost as a  result of 
industrial  disputes;  the  figures  for  coalmining  and vehicle 
production  were  667  and 436  respectively.  The strike  rate 
in shipbuilding is  five  times greater than for manufacturing 
as  a  whole.  At  the  Belfast  yard  of  Harland  and  Wolff, 
70-80 man hours are needed to build 1 ton of ship, whereas 
Japanese  and  the  best  Swedish  yards  require  only  20-30 
man  hours.  With  such  a  difference  in  efficiency  Japanese 
builders could afford to pay very much higher wages  than 
those in Belfast.  In fact the  average Japanese wage  rate is 
66  p per hour compared with 63  p  in Britain. German and 
Danish  wages  are  also  higher  than  those  in  Britain,  and 
those in Sweden are twice the British rate at £1-33  an hour. 
Japanese  yards  are  able  to  benefit  from  the  peculiar 
nature of labour-management relations that exists in Japan. 
An unspoken  pledge  of loyalty  obtains  between  the  com-
pany  and  its  workforce.  A  man  will  expect  to  work  for 
one firm  for life, in return for which he is never dismissed 
and  is  able  to  participate  in  a  variety  of fringe  benefits 
such as  low cost housing. Strikes are extremely rare within 
this paternalistic framework and round the clock shifts are 
the rule. 
2.  Innovation  and  economies  of large  scale  production. 
The Japanese have come closest to the use of mass produc-
tion techniques and they have applied the best traditions of 
the  vehicle  industry  to  the  manufacture  of  diesels  and 
turbines by flow  production methods. The 'tear drop' bow, 
which improves  speed  without  a  proportionate increase  in 
engine  capacity,  originated  in  Western  Europe,  but it was 
the Japenese  who  adopted  it as  standard in  their tankers. 
An  important field  for  Japanese  innovation  has  been  the 
construction  of very  large  building  docks.  The economies 
of large scale production are such that as the size of vessel 
increases,  the  cons~ction  cost  per  ton  falls,  although 
obviously the cost of the complete vessel rises with its size. 
There is  much incentive, therefore, to expand capacity and 
additionally running costs  per ton of vessel  fall  quite dra-
matically when  the ship is  in operation. The big  oil com-
panies in particular have thus been eager to buy supertank-
ers. Yards on the Clyde, Wear, Tyne, Seine and Maas have 
consequently  been  expanded  to  take  200,000-300,000  ton 
tankers. AG Weser and Bremer Vulkan can build ships of 
250,000  tons  and expect  to  be able  to launch 500,000  ton 
vessels when the Weser is dredged, and Blohm und Voss are 
building a  400,000  ton dock using a  disused canal adjacent 
to  the  River  Elbe  at  Hamburg.  There  are  many  other 
examples.  The scale  of the Japanese  operations,  however, 
is at quite a  different level  for the docks  now under cons-
truction  in  Western  Europe  are  already  obsolescent  by 
their  standards.  The  Kawasaki  company  is  building  a 
900,000  ton yard and Ishikawajima Heavy Industries  (IHI) 
have  almost  finished  an  800,000  ton  dock  at  Kure, 
30,000  m2  having  been  reclaimed  from  the  sea  for  the 
purpose.  Rather than  wait for  the  dock  to  be  completed, 
IHI are using part of it to build a  4  77,000  ton tanker for 
Globtik Tankers. Nippon Kokan are contemplating a  1 mil-
lion  ton  dock  at Tsu.  Having  built  these  huge  docks  the 
Japanese then use  them much more intensively  than is  the 
case  in  Western  Europe.  Nippon  Kokan,  for  example, 
completed  6  supertankers  from  one  dock in 1971,  but the 
recently  modernised  Swan  Hunter yard  on  Tyneside  does 
not expect to build more than  1.5  supertankers each year. 
By  spreading  the cost  of the equipment and  of the  dock 
over  a  large  number  of ships,  the  Japanese  are  able  to 
reduce the price of each vessel still further. 
3.  Integration.  Some West European yards have financial 
links  with  steel  firms,  as  do  AG Weser  with  Krupp  and 
Blohm  und  Voss  with  August  Thyssen  Hutte,  the  largest 
German steel combine.  Other yards have developed  profit-
able  subsidiaries  such  as  the  important  diesel  branch  of 
Burmeister  and  Wain  at  Copenhagen,  while  many  have 
entered shiprepair, as have Blohm und Voss and Verolme in 
Rotterdam.  The  Japanese,  on  the  other  hand,  have  been 
much  more  thoroughgoing  in  their  efforts  at  integration 
and  have  diversified  into  both  mechanical  and  electrical 
engineering.  Since  fabrication  requires  much  work  fo  be 
carried  out by specialists,  there  are obvious  advantages  in 
integration  of  this  kind.  Integration  does  not  end  here, 
however, for Japanese shipbuilders are merely part of huge 
trading  companies,  or  zaibatsu,  with  interests  across  the 
board  from  real  estate,  finance  and insurance  through  to 
iron and steel manufacture. Shipyards thus have both access 
to  supplies  and  favourable  supply  prices.  There  are  nine 
of these zaibatsu in the Japanese shipbuilding industry and 
they  produce  nearly  half the  world's  tonnage.  West  Ger-
many on the other hand builds one fifteenth of the world's 
output from five  major and 45  smaller yards. 
4.  Capital  supply.  The Japanese  do not lack for supply 
of capital owing  to the very size  of the zaibatsu. Three of 
these,  Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo, all with shipbuild-
ing divisions, have total assets of 14.3, 13.3  and 13  per cent 
respectively of the total assets  of firms  listed on the Tokyo 
stock exchange. With such massive backing the appropriate 
investments can be made to improve profitability. In West-
ern  Europe  profits  have  been  so  small  that it is  difficult 
to raise capital for improvements of any sort. Since  many 
yards  have  not  made  a  profit  for  half  a  decade,  only 
governments have seen fit  to invest in them. 
Rationalisation by Wf;lSt European shipyards 
Faced with such extraordinarily gloomy prospects, Euro-
pean yards have been forced to reorganise themselves quite 
radically.  Ironically,  governments  funds,  by  shoring  up DISTRIBUTION. OF  THE.<MAJOR 
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Q >  300 (Actual capacity .shown and town named) crumbling  edifices,  have  slowed  down  the  process.  Never-
theless  changes  have  been  undertaken.  Some  are  of  a 
minor nature  and include  such  measures  as  a  20  per cent 
reduction  in  staff  at the Emden  yard  of Rheinstahl  Nord-
seewerke,  the  use  of underemployed  labour at the Toulon 
naval dockyard to complete methane tankers for the nearby 
yard of La Ciotat where there is a labour shortage, and the 
closure  of  a  subsidiary  building  dock  at  Le  Trait  in 
April  1971  to  permit  concentration  of  production  at  the 
parent yard at La Ciotat.  Changes  of a  more  fundamental 
kind may be grouped into three categories. 
1.  Standardisation  and  specialisation.  Following  the 
example of the Japanese and Henry Ford, some yards have 
accepted that the mass production of a single type of vessel 
will bring down production costs. This is  the solution devis-
ed  by  the  Wearside  firm  of  Austin  and  Pickersgill,  one 
of the  few  profitable  West  European firms.  They produce 
a  medium sized cargo vessel,  the SD 14,  and at .the  begin-
ning  of  1971  had  an  order  book  of  32  such  ships.  In 
contrast the unprofitable Tyneside yard of Swan Hunter at 
this  time  was  contracted  to  build  20  ships  ranging  from 
trawlers  to  supertankers,  and  was  building  them  in  nine 
different  yards.  AG  Weser  has  been  using  a  single  super-
tanker design since 1967 and expects to retain it until 1975; 
the  strategy  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  the  man  hours 
needed  to  build  the  fourth  ship  in  the  series  was  three-
quarters that required for the first.  While  not standardising 
their production to this extent, many yards are nevertheless 
specialists and those at the  smaller end of the  range avoid 
competition  with  the  Japanese  supertanker specialists.  The 
36  Dutch trawler-coaster yards, all of which are profitable, 
exemplify this approach. They employ 2,500 workers, export 
80  per cent of their output and have an interesting 80  year 
old method of arriving at the price of their vessels. 
Representatives  of  the  workers  negotiate  a  price  at 
which they agree to build the ship,  and although the price 
may be  high,  the shipowner is  assured of delivery  on time. 
Another  profit  making  specialist  is  Vosper-Thornycroft, 
the Southampton and Portsmouth naval frigate and torpedo 
boat  builder.  Verolme  at  Rotterdam  has  become  a  spe-
cialist tanker and bulk carrier builder, but in  this  range it 
must compete  with  the  Japanese  and  is  thus  unprofitable. 
2.  Mergers  and  yard  specialisation.  An important  result 
of the amalgamation of several yards is the scale economies 
that are  obtained.  Conoship is  a  company  formed  by  the 
merging  of 14  small firms  in  the  Netherlands. The size  of 
the firm  is  such as  to justify the construction  of a  central-
ised steel fabricating facility at Groningen, while there is a 
single  design  division  and  one  materials  purchasing  unit. 
Some  mergers  are  more  comprehensive  and  result  in  the 
complete  reorganisation  of  particular  yards  so  that  each 
yard in the group becomes a specialist builder. This strategy 
is  an  important  one  and  was  proposed  by  the  Geddes 
Report  which  recommended  the  establishment  of  the  ill-
fated  Upper  Clyde  Shipbuilders.  The  Dutch  Winsemius 
Commission  similarly  suggested  that  vessels  up  to  40,000 
tons  be constructed in the  Alblasserdam yards  of Verolme 
and  Van  der  Giessen,  which  were  to  merge,  that  vessels 
between  40,000  and  150,000  tons  be  built  at  the  merged 
facilities  of Rotterdam  Dockyard and Wilton  Fijenoord at 
Rotterdam,  and  that  larger  ships  be  produced  by  the 
Verolme  yard  at  Botlek.  The  Howaldtswerke  Deutsche 
Werft (HDW)  consortium,  the  largest firm in Europe,  bas 
taken  this  line  of action.  Its  Kiel  yards  specialise  in  con-
tainer vessels  (one  third of the world's container ships  are 
built in West  Germany),  one  of its  Hamburg yards  builds 
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oil rigs and the other carries out repair work. Unfortunately 
it is  still  unprofitable. 
3.  Diversification.  Although  there  are  advantages .to  be 
had from  specialisation, in certain  sectors  diversification  is 
a viable proposition. Ship repair work is  profitable, and an 
increasing  number  of yards  are moving  into this  activity. 
In 1971,  for example,  Blohm und Voss  set  up a  repairing 
facility  at  the  entrance  to the  Kiel  canal  in combination 
with  a  salvage  firm.  The Norwegian  Aker group is  diver-
sifying  into  oil  rigs  to  take  advantage  of  the  North Sea 
oil  and  gas  discoveries,  while  Vosper-Thornycroft  are 
adventurously entering a  Russian dominated field  and plan 
to built hydrofoils to a Swiss design. 
Government action  in shipbullding 
In the majority of countries shipbuilding is  now regarded 
either  as  an instrument of national  economic  development 
or as a regional planning problem. Japan holds the former 
view,  and  her  government  has  followed  a  cheap  money 
policy since 1953 when the Japan Development Bank began 
to  subsidise  interest  rates  above  5  per  cent  on  loans  to 
yards by banks. Vessels for export qualify for eight year loans 
on 80  per cent of the purchase price at 6 per cent interest, 
while  loans for Japanese owners are even more favourable 
-80 per cent of the  cost of the ship at 4 per cent interest 
repayable  over  15  years. There is  also  a  15  per cent  pro-
tective  tariff  on imported ships.  Coupled with the  excellent 
productivity  record  of  the  Japanese,  this  financial  policy 
has  been  the  basis  of  the  country's  present  dominance. 
West  European  governments,  with  the  exception  of Spain 
and to some  extent France, have  not used the industry  to 
enhance economic growth, rather it is  seen as an important 
employer  of  labour  which  must  be  supported  to  prevent 
local  unemployment.  There  are  20,000  shipyard  workers 
in Bremen and even more in Hamburg, where it is the third 
employer  of  labour.  The  industry  is  the  basis  of  Kiel's 
economy,  and it is  not surprising  that in  all  these  towns 
there is  support from  both the Federal and the  Land gov-
ernments. In Great Britain the major yards are in the older 
industrial districts and thus receive Development Area sub-
sidies  equal to 4 per cent  of the  cost of a  ship,  but these 
are also precisely the areas with high unemployment rates, 
so that any reduction in workplaces or closures will exacer-
bate  the  position.  Male  unemployment  on Clydeside  early 
in  1972  was  12.1  per cent,  while  the figures  for Wearside, 
Tyneside  and  Teesside  were  11.5,  10.4  and  9.8  per  cent 
respectively.  As  at Kiel,  the industry is  the cornerstone of 
the  regional  economy  in  Belfast  where  the  Harland  and 
Wolff  yard  employs  9  per  cent  of  Northern  Ireland's 
manufacturing  labour.  The  economic  viability  of  these 
yards is  thus obscured by social considerations. 
During the  1960's West European governments  introduc-
ed the  cheap  money  policy  for  yards  and  for  customers 
pioneered  by  the  Japanese  a  decade  earlier.  Firms  were 
aided by tax exemptions, research grants, equipment grants, 
protective  duties,  and  by  the  mid-1960's,  when  profits 
were  becoming  very  thin  and  therefore capital  for  ration-
alisation  scarce,  governments  began  to  grant  funds  to 
specific  firms  on  the  verge  of bankruptcy.  In some  cases 
the cash carried a  proviso  tha:t  mergers  be  effected,  and it 
was  in this way that the Scott-Lithgow group at Greenock 
and  the  Upper  Clyde  Shipbuilders  were  created  in  1966 
from  the  seven  yards  along  the  river.  Between  1966  and 1970  UCS  received  £20  million  from  the  government,  and 
in  February  1972  the  finn  was  allocated  £35  million  to 
prevent  total  collapse  and  what would  have  amounted  to 
civil  strife in the  region.  Faced with redundancy and little 
hope  of immediate  work  in  the  area,  UCS  workers  had 
taken over the yard and had run it themselves as  a gesture 
of defiance  towards a  government that seemed oblivious  of 
their  plight.  The  German  HOW  group  at Hamburg  was 
created at government instigation  from  loss  making yards, 
although  Federal  support  has  been  far  less  than  that 
assigned to UCS.  Other yards  that have  been in receipt  of 
emergency  support include  Cammell  Laird  at Birkenhead, 
Verolme  at  Rotterdam,  Burmeister  and  Wain  at  Copen~ 
hagen, the French yard at La Ciotat and even the renowned 
Swedish  yard  Gotaverken  at Gothenburg.  Sometimes  gov-
ernments  take  a  financial  shareholding  in  shipyards  in 
return for support; the Northern Ireland administration has 
a  47.6  per cent  interest  in  Harland and Wolff,  while  the 
Schleswig  Holstein  Land  government  holds  25  per  cent 
of HOW's shares. The logical  extension  of this  process  is 
complete  nationalisation.  This  has  occurred  in  Italy  with 
the  absorption  of the  last  private  yard,  CNTR, into Ital-
cantieri, the shipbuilding subsidiary of IRI, the state indus-
trial corporation, in 1970. 
In  spite  of  these  measures  shipbuilding  in  Western 
Europe is  for the most part unprofitable, and the EEC and 
Britain  are  following  the  OECD's  recommendations  to 
improve efficiency by scaling down future financial support. 
The OECO estimates  that governments are responsible  for 
between  12  and  15  per  cent  of  the  value  of  new  ships, 
equal  to $650-750  million  in  1970,  and  suggests  that this 
is  too much. EEC policy is  therefore to restrict aid to ship-
building to 4 per cent in  1973  and 3 per cent in  1974,  and 
Britain is  to try to reduce  its  support from the present  10 
per cent level to those planned by the EEC. If these policies 
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come  to  fruition,  there  is  little  doubt  that  there  will  be 
contraction in the industry, for there seems little likelyhood 
of being able to catch the  Japanese who,  faced  with rising 
domestic  wage  bills,  are  now  building  yards  in  countries 
like Taiwan and Malaysia where labour is  still very cheap. 
The mixture of low labour cost and Japanese expertise and 
capital  should  remove  the  possibility  of profitability  from 
all but the specialist West European yards, for which there 
will  always  be  a  place.  Labour costs  are  less  of a  factor 
in  the  construction  of  warships,  dredgers,  trawlers,  ferry 
boats and container ships  than in the case  of tankers, and 
Japanese  competition  will  be  much  less  severe.  The  fact 
remains,  however,  that  on  economic  grounds  there  is  a 
strong  case  for  running  down  the  unprofitable  sectors  of 
Western  Europe's  shipbuilding  capacity  and retraining  the 
workers  for  a  profitable  economic  activity.  On  the  other 
hand,  governments  may  wish  to  retain  the  industry  on 
social  grounds,  and  additionally  may  desire  to  maintain 
some unprofitable yards for strategic reasons. 
Further reading 
Shipbuilding  Inquiry  Committee,  1965-1966,  Report  (The 
Geddes Report), HMSO, 1966. 
OECO,  The  situation  in  the  Shipbuilding  Industry,  Paris, 
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Anon,  "The  European  Shipbuilding  Industry",  European 
Trends,  8,  July  1966. 
Shipbuilding and Shipping Record, London, weekly. 
Financial Times, London. Regular articles and supplements. 
R.  C.  Riley,  Industrial  Geography,  Chatto  and  Windus, 
London, 1972 (in press). European  Studies,  14,  1972 
The Aerospace  industry  Europe 
•  1n 
Developing and producing  aircraft,  guided  weapons  and  space  vehicles  is  an  important 
industry in  western Europe. High  development costs and the  need for  large  markets to offset 
these costs have led to many joint European aerospace projects. 
Politically both prestige and military criteria are  significant and national governments are 
deeply involved in  the industry. It is estimated that Concorde will cost the British and French 
governments  some  £1,000  millions  each  to  develop.  Military  requirements  form  a  major 
component of the industries'  work and here again European nations are· co-operating to  build 
aircraft which satisfy their joint needs. 
Aerospace stretches  the capabilities of other sectors of an  economy such  as  chemicals in 
the .  demand  for  light,  tough  plastics;  electronics  for  sophisticated  instrumentation  and  the 
metal  industries  for  special  alloys  and  new  materials.  The  complexity  of  the  production 
process demands the most competent and effective techniques of managerial control. 
Technological  advances  first  made  in  aerospace  are  now  applied  in  other  fields;  gas 
turbines  for  industrial  uses  and  ships;  aerodynamic  techniques  in  the  development  of  the 
Advanced Passenger  Train,  and carbon-fibres,  which  are  potentially  of great  significance  in 
industrial applications. 
The British aerospace industry employed some 200,000  people and had an  output valued 
at $1584  in  1969.  If Europe  is  to maintain an  effective  aerospace  industry  the  British  contri-
bution will be  important. 
In the ruins of 1945, the only surviving aerospace industry 
in Europe was that of the United Kingdom. There had been 
a  boom during  the war years,  and immediately afterwards 
British energies were  turned to producing a  whole range of 
new  aircraft;  airliners  like  the  Comet,  Viscount,  Ambas-
sador; military aircraft like the V-Bombers, Hunter fighters, 
and the multi-role Canberra. However the pattern remained 
one  of  relatively  small,  competing  firms,  with  payrolls  of 
up  to  10,000,  each  producing  their  own  designs.  On  the 
Continent recovery  began  in  France,  the  Netherlands  and 
Italy;  the  German  aircraft  industry,  once  immensely  pro-
ductive,  efficient  and  imaginative,  was  shattered,  and  lie 
dormant until the mid-1950's. 
In the 1950's two things began to happen: the continental 
industries  began  to  rival  Britain  as  aircraft  producers; 
world-class designs  began  to  emerge  from European facto-
ries,  like  the  Dutch  Fokker  F-27  Friendship  and  French 
Caravelle airliners, and the French Mirage and Italian Fiat 
G91  fighters.  Towards  the  end  of  the  decade  European 
firms  (in  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Italy  and  West  Ger-
many)  co-operated  to produce  under licence  and  in  huge 
numbers the American F-104G Starfighter, a  fairly  advanc-
ed,  multi-purpose  supersonic  fighter.  Britain  lost  its  Euro-
pean domination,  but remained by  far the  most important 
single  producer. The development and production costs  of 
aircraft began to rise;  £10,000 would have bought a  fighter 
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in the  1940's; the Hunter cost £100,000, while the Lightning, 
of the  early  1960's,  cost more  like  £500,000.  The  cost  of 
materials,  and  skilled  manpower  needed  to  develop  new 
aircraft  rose  markedly.  This,  combined  with  greater intra-
European  competition  and  competition  with  the  United 
States, pointed logically towards amalgamation. 
Governments  responding  to  this  new  situation  began 
to  press  aerospace  companies  to  form  larger  groups; 
at times  more  than gentle  persuasion  was  needed  to force 
old-established rivals to amalgamate. In Britain, during the 
early  1960's,  the  British Aircraft Corporation and  Hawker 
Siddeley  Aviation  were  formed  to  produce  aircraft  and 
missiles.  In  1967  engine  production  was  centred  on  Rolls 
Royce  when  that company  took  over  Bristol  Siddeley.  In 
France,  two  major  airframe  groups  were  formed-the 
privately-owned Dassault-Breguet company and the Govern-
ment-owned group Aerospatiale. Engine  production is  con-
centrated mainly on SNECMA, with Turbomeca occupying 
second  place.  West  Germany  has  Messerschmitt-Bolkow-
Blohm,  Dornier and the German half of a  Dutch-German 
firm,  VFW-Fokker, producing airframes, while  engine pro-
duction has  been concentrated on  Motoren- und Turbinen-
Union  (MTU).  In  Italy,  aerospace  activities  are  based  on 
the  aviation  division  of  the  huge  FIAT  complex  and  a 
number  of  smaller companies  like  Aermacchi,  SIAl  Mar-
chetti  and Piaggio.  These national groupings are all small, compared to the American companies, but they are amalga-
mations  that have  reached a  more rational size.  There are 
no signs  of any more  purely  national  amalgamations,  but 
certain  international  mergers  were  discussed  some  years 
ago:  amalgamations of SNECMA/Rolls Royce and Messer-
schmitt-Bolkow-Blohm/British  Aircraft  Corporation  were 
rumoured, but have not materialised.  Only one truly inter-
national  company  has  emerged-Fokker-VFW, a  straight-
forward  merger  of a  Dutch firm  and  a  German firm;  no 
others  are in  sight.  It did  seem  possible  at one stage  that 
a  multi-national  European  engine  company  would  result 
due  to  the  recent  Rolls  Royce  crisis,  but  this  has  not 
happened. 
Table 1. 
European aerospace  companies (1969) and major  US 
competitors 
Company  I  Country  !Employees 
Hawker Siddeley  UK  47,000 
Aerospatiale  France  42,000 
British  Aircraft Corporation  UK  36,000 
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm  Germany  20,000 
Dassault/Breguet  France  13,000 
Westland  UK  12,200 
VFW/Fokker  Netherlands/  10,900 
Germany 
Dornier  Germany  7,000 
Shorts  UK  6,000 
Fiat Aviation  Italy  6,000 
Agusta  Italy  2,500 
Aermacchi  Italy  1,500 
McDonnell Douglas  USA  107,000 
Boeing  USA  108,000 
Aero-Engines 
Rolls  Royce  UK  70,000 
SNECMA  France  15,000 
MTU  Germany  4,400 
Pratt and Whitney  USA  45,000 
International consortia 
The  international  activities  of  the  European  aerospace 
industry have generally taken the form of collaboration on 
specific  projects,  often sponsored by national governments. 
International  ae~ospace collaboration  is  rather  a  strange 
phenomenon,  ptirsu~d for many different motives.  Govern-
ments  have  seen, it  as  a  way  of  reducing  the  massive 
research and development costs of advanced projects: com-
panies  have  tended  to view  it as  a  means  of countering 
American  competition,  but whatever  the  motives,  a  large 
number  of  collaborative  projects  are  now  under  way  in 
Europe. 
These  are  sometimes  organised  on  a  straightforward 
company-to-company  basis,  like  Concorde;  this  project  is 
administered by a Committee of Officials  appointed by  the 
British  and  French Governments,  to  which  the  companies 
are  responsible.  However,  a  number  of important  collab-
orative consortia have been established: 
1.  SEPECAT  (Societe  europeenne  de  la  production  de 
l'avion  ecole  de  combat  et appui  tactique)  is  the  Anglo-
French company concerned with  the Jaguar project. Jaguar 
is  a  light supersonic  trainer/strike  aircraft being  developed 
jointly  by  the  two  countries under the  terms  of an agree-
ment  of May  1965.  A  Jaguar  Management Committee  of 
civil servants was  appointed by the governments of the two 
countries.  SEPECAT,  the  complementary industrial  organ-
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isation,  was  formed  in  May  (1966)  by  Breguet  Aviation 
and  British  Aircraft  Corporation.  It exists  solely  for  the 
Jaguar programme; there is  little possibility of its becoming 
more  permanent.  SEPECAT  will  cease  to  exist  when  the 
Jaguar programme comes to an end. 
2.  The largest European collaborative programme, taking 
in  Britain, Italy and West Germany is  for the development 
and construction of a Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), 
or Panavia  200;  Panavia  is  the  name  of a  tripartite  com-
pany  formed  to manage  the  programme.  It is  responsible 
to NAMMO, the  Nato  MRCA  Management Organisation 
(an  enlarged  Committee  of Officials  on  the  lines  of that 
supervising SEPECAT). Panavia's duties include the design, 
development  and  production  of  the  aircraft.  Its  joint 
owners  are  British  Aircraft  Corporation,  Messerschmitt-
Bolkow-Blohm  and  Fiat,  and  an  associate  company, 
A  vionica, deals with the advanced electronic systems of the 
aircraft,  advising  Panavia  on  the  most  suitable  European 
suppliers  for  specific  components.  A  vionica  is  purely 
advisory and has no executive  function. 
3.  The  A300B  European  Airbus  is  being  developed  by 
Aerospatiale  (France),  Deutsche  Airbus  (West  Germany), 
Fokker-VFW  (Netherlands),  and  Hawker  Siddeley  (UK), 
under the sponsorship of the French, German and Nether-
lands  Governments.  Aerospatiale has  always  had full  con-
trol  over  this  project,  being  the  design  leader,  and  estab-
lished a co-ordinating company, known as Airbus Industrie; 
this  is  responsible  for  the design,  development,  production 
and marketing of the airbus.  Like Panavia and SEPECAT, 
this  is  an ad hoc arrangement unlikely to  outlive the pro-
gramme it administers. 
Structurally,  therefore,  the  European  aerospace industry 
is  something of a  mixture;  larger national companies  have 
replaced  the  multitude  of  independent  competing  firms, 
and these are increasingly involved in collaborative projects. 
One  truly  international  company,  Fokker-VFW,  has  been 
formed but there are as yet no signs of others. It would be 
an  exaggeration  to  call  the  European  aerospace  industry 
integrated  on  a  continental  basis;  but the  movements  are 
in that direction as  companies, are forced to pool resources 
and collaborate on projects. The initial optimism surround-
ing international  cooperation  has  now  largely  gone,  being 
replaced  by  a  more  realistic  attitude  that  recognises  the 
many  problems  involved.  But  vast  collaborative  projects 
like  Concorde,  A300B  Airbus  and  the  Panavia  200  are 
moving ahead. 
Markets 
1.  Europe 
In  both  civil  and  military  markets  the  European  home 
industry has lost ground to American competition since the 
war.  (Table  2  gives  some  idea  of the extent of US  dom-
ination  at present.) 
The  picture  revealed  is  not  a  particularly  encouraging 
one.  Of  the  major  types  of  airliner-long,  medium,  and 
short-haul  jets,  and  short-haul  turboprops-Europe  has 
designs at least equal to those of the US, yet the market is 
completely  dominated  by US firms.  In Europe  the  British 
BAC VC1 0 lost the battle for markets to the Douglas DCS 
and Boeing 707;  the Trident lost to the Boeing 727, and the 
One-Eleven  and  Caravelle  lost  to  the  Boeing  737  and 
Douglas DC9. Europe generates  a  tremendous demand for 
air  transport,  one  which  a  European  aerospace  industry 
might be expected to provide for, yet this has manifestly not 
been  the  case.  There  are many lessons  to  be  drawn  from 
this;  perhaps the primary lesson has been that sheer inven-
tiveness,  design  :flair  and production integrity are not suffi-
cient for an advanced-technology, capital-intensive industry 
like aerospace.  The sheer volume  of resources  that can be 
poured into production count for more. Airliners need to be 
adaptable,  and to suit the  market;  they  should be  capable A WIDE RANGE OF AIRCRAFT ARE  PRODUCED  IN  EUROPE  RANGING FROM 
SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT TO  LIGHT, UTILITY AIRCRAFT 
A)  LIST OF CIVIL AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT PRODUCED IN EUROPE 
a)  Civil  Aircraft 
.  t  I  !  a1rcra t  i country  1 
BAC One-Eleven  ;  UK  l 
! 
Hawker Siddeley Trident  .
1
!  UUKK  ji 
Hawker Siddeley 125 
Hawker Siddeley 748  I  UK  ! 
BAC/Aerospatiale Concorde  j  UK/F  i 
Short Skyvan 
1 
UK  II 
Fokker-VFW F 27  N/G 
Fokker-VFW F 28  1 N/G/UK 1 
Fokker-VFW 614  1  G/N  1 
Dassault Mercure  I  F  j 
Dassault Fan Jet Falcon  l  F  1 
Airbus lndustrie A300B  I F/G/N I 
------------~------~ 
b)  Military Aircraft 
engines (no)  seats 
Rolls Royce Spey (2) 
Rolls Royce Spey (3) 
Rolls Royce Viper (2) 
Rolls Royce Dart (2) 
I 
79-119 
up to 171 
7-12 
Rolls Royce/ Snecma Olympus (4) 
Garrett (US) (2) 
Rolls Royce Dart (2) 
Rolls Royce Spey (2) 
Rolls Royce M45H (2) 
Pratt & Whitney (US) JT8D-15 (2) 
General Electric (US)  CF700 (2) 
General Electri~  (US) CF-6-50A (2) I 
45-60 
128 
20 
48-56 
50-79 
44 
155 
10 
250-306 
In 
service 
1965 
1964 
1964 
1961 
1
1975? 
1966 
1958 
1
1969  I 
1973 
1
1973 
1966 
11974 
no sold 
203 
88 
250+ 
250+ 
74 {options) 
50+ 
600+ 
35+ 
24 
10 (options) 
150+ 
39 (options) 
-----------------·------·---r-------r-·---------------.--------..,...----.,.-------1 
1  '  in 
aircraft  I  country  engines  (no)  role  service no sold 
SEPECAT Jaguar 
Panavia 200 
i  UK/F 
! UK/1/G 
Rolls Royce/Turbomeca Adour (2)  strike/trainer  I 1971 
1 Rolls Royce/MTU  RB.199 (2)  multi-role I combat I 1977 
1969 
1965 
I 
I  J  aircraft 
BAC 167  Strikemaster  I  UK  I Rolls Royce Viper (2)  basic trainer/attack  1967 
Hawker Siddeley  Nimrod  l  UK  Rolls Royce  Spey (4)  maritime  patrol  1969 
I 
Hawker Siddeley  Harrier  1  UK  ! Rolls Royce  Peagasus (1)  VTOL  fighter 
Hawker Siddeley  Buccaneer  1  UK  Rolls Royce  Spey (2)  attack 
i  Westland  Sea King  i  UK  General Electric (US) T64 (2)  maritime helicopter  1970 
Aerospatiale/Westland Puma  1  F/UK  Rolls Royce/Turbomeca  medium  helicopter  1969 
1974 
1972 
Westland/ Aerospatiale Lynx  l  UK/F 
1 
Rolls Royce  medium 
Westland/  Aerospatiale Gazelle  i  F  /UK  Snecma/ Rolls Royce  light  helicopter 
400+ 
800+ 
80 
38 
200+ 
166 
86 
250+ 
200+ 
450+ 
Breguet Br1150 Atlantique  I  F  /G /N  Rolls Royce  Tyne (2)  ,~  maritime patrol 
Dassault/ Mirage (all versions)  I  F  Snecma A  tar  9 (2)  fighter 
1965  81 
Macchi MB, 326  I  Rolls Royce  Viper (1)  strike/ trainer 
1958  2000+ 
1969 
1962 
55+ 
300+ 
Fiat G91Y  _j'  I  General Electric  J85 (US) (2)  I  fighter 
----~------------------~----------~----~----~ 
F= France  G=Germany  N =Netherlands  I= Italy  UK= United  Kingdom 
B) THE  EXPLOSION IN  AIR  TRAVEL 
- Passenger revenue, ton-miles 
- Freight and mail revenue, ton-miles 
x  =  Revenue in ton-miles x 1000 millions-
Passengers 
y  =  Revenue in ton-miles x 1000 millions-
Freight 
X  y 
13 0 
1300 
12  ~  j 
1200  ~ 
11  -
1100  i 
1  ooo·+=-
1~
0  F-+-+--+-+-t--t-+--i--t-t_._!".......-.t 
; rm 
900  ~ 
fVl  r 
1962 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70  75  80  85 
Source : "  Flight International "• 24th June 1971 
C) EMPLOYMENT IN  AEROSPACE 
INDUSTRIES FOR  UNITED STATES 
AND WESTERN  EUROPE (1969) 
U.S.A. 
1,150,000 
~~Jt,·.~oo  ~ 
France  J 
96,000 
Germany (F R) /-.....~..........._~Netherlands 
53,000  /  '  8 000 
Italy  Belgium  ' 
25,000  10,000 of evolution  to meet  changing  demand.  European  aircraft 
like  the  Trident,  Caravelle,  and  One-Eleven  lost  sales 
because they could not be "stretched" sufficiently in payload 
and range.  European  airlines  needing  large-capacity  short-
haul aircraft, bought from the United States. 
Smaller types of European aeroplane-notably the Dutch 
Fokker  F-27  Friendship,  a  twin-turboprop  45-55  seater-
have done well,  and so,  to some extent,  has the  European 
aero-engine industry;  in effect  Rolls  Royce.  In addition to 
providing  engines  for  most  indigenous  European  types, 
they sold Conway turbofans for use in many of the earlier 
Douglas DC8's and Boeing 707's and now RB  211 's for the 
Lockheed  Tristar;  this  is  not  however  the  happiest  of 
stories. 
For the future the Americans are bound to dominate the 
long  and  medium-haul  markets,  simply  because  they  are 
the  only  suppliers;  the  Boeing  747  'jumbo'  is  in  service 
with  every  major  European  airline.  Among  the  slightly 
smaller  trijets,  the  McDonnell  Douglas  DC10  has  been 
ordered  by  Lufthansa,  Sabena,  KLM,  UTA  (France)  and 
Alitalia among the Common Market airlines;  the  recently-
reprieved Lockheed TriStar can be expected to sell to BEA, 
BOAC  and  perhaps  British  Caledonian  due  to  its  British 
Rolls  Royce  RB211  engines. It is  at the  short-haul end  of 
the  'jumbo'  market  that  Europe  is  strong.  The  A300B 
Airbus,  being  produced  by  Aerospatiale  (France), 
Hawker  Siddeley  (UK),  Fokker-VFW  (Netherlands) 
and  Deutsche  Airbus  (Germany)  is  a  250-306  seat 
The  next  twelve  months  should  show  whether  Concorde 
will be any more than an astronomically expensive research 
programme, or a  commercially viable aeroplane. Its failure 
would be a serious blow to European aerospace technology; 
its success would put it in a strong position for many years 
to come. 
Among triilitary  aircraft Europe has done a  little better; 
the  only American type to sell in Europe in large numbers 
has  been  the  McDonnel  Douglas  F-4 Phantom,  in  service 
in the  United Kingdom and Germany. The British version 
(with  Rolls  Royce  Spey  engines)  is  about one-half  British 
by value. The US-designed  F-104G Starfighter was  produc-
ed in large numbers by a European consortium in the early 
1960's, and now forms the mainstay of the Italian, German, 
Belgian  and  Netherlands  air  forces,  but indigenous  types 
like  the  French  Mirage,  British  Lightning  and  Harrier, 
and Italian Fiat G91  are also in large-scale service. 
The  next  generation  of combat  aircraft Should  be  pre-
dominantly  European;  Panavia  200,  being  developed  by 
Britain,  West  Germany  and  Italy,  should  equip  those 
countries'  air  forces  for  many  years  to  come;  France  is 
developing  a  similar  aircraft,  the  Mirage  G8,  which  has 
already  flown.  Other  European  types  in  production  to 
supply the home air forces in the coming years include the 
Anglo-French  Jaguar  supersonic  strike/trainer,  and  the 
British  Hawker  Siddeley  Harrier,  unique  as  the  world's 
only  operational  VTOL  aircraft.  Europe  should  be  self-
sufficient in combat aircraft in the future. 
Table  2 
Major European airlines:  main  types  of US and European 
equipment in  service or on  order, 1970 
US  EQUIPMENT  EUROPEAN EQUIPMENT 
Boeing  Douglas 
707  1727  1737  1747 I  ocsl oc91 octo·  I  BAC I  Tri I  Cara-1  I  I  Con- VCIO  111  dent  velle  F27  F28  corde 
BOAC  27  - - 12  -
BEA  - - - - -
British 
Caledonian  4  - - - -
Air France  38  17  8  - -
Air  Inter 
(France)  - - - - -
UTA 
(France)  - - - - 11 
KLM  - - - 7  30 
Lufthansa  22  27  26  6  -
Sabena  7  5  - 2  -
Iberia  3  - - - 12 
Aer Lingus  4  - 8  2  -
Alitalia  - - - s  25 
twin  engined  short-haul  transport.  Due  to  fly  in  1972, 
it has  not yet attracted any firm  orders,  but 39  'letters  of 
intent'  to  buy  have  been  lodged,  mainly  by  Air  France, 
Lufthansa  and  European  charter  airlines.  Among  smaller 
aircraft  two  products  of the  Dutch-German  firm  Fokker-
VFW,  the  F28  55-79  seater  and  the  614  44-seater  should 
sell well in the future.  An outsider is  the  Dassault-Breguet 
Mercure, optimised for short-haul operation. 
Then  there  is  Concorde;  this  immensely  expensive  and 
advanced  Anglo-French  supersonic  transport is  still  await-
ing a decision to move ahead into full production.  ~venty­
four delivery positions have  been reserved,  but this is  very 
different  from  a  firm  order.  The  aircraft  has  satisfied  its 
technical specification, and it remains to be seen whether it 
can  overcome  the  formidable  obstacles  of cost and noise. 
-
-
- -
-
-
15 
-
-
24 
-
36 
3 
- 31  - - - - - 8 
- - 18  65  - - - -
- 4  20  - - - - -
- - - - 46  2  - 8 
- - - - 9  10  - -
4  - - - 2  - - -
6  - - - - - 2  -
4  - - - - - - 3 
2  - - - 10  - - 2 
- - - - 19  8  3  -
- - 4  - - 7  - -
4  - - - 21  - - -
Among  guided  weapons,  Europe  is  already  largely  self-
sufficient, and advanced types like the French Exocet (ship-
to-ship),  British  Rapier  (ground-to-air)  and  Anglo-French 
Martel are in production. The UK has  found  it necessary 
to  buy  her  Polaris  submarine-launched  ballistic  missiles 
from  the  United  States,  but France  is  building  her  own. 
Demand for  space  vehicles  is  strictly  limited.  The  only 
national space programme of any size  in Europe-France's 
-is minute  by  US and Russian  standards,  but the launch 
vehicles,  satellites  and  instrumentation  are  in  the  main 
French-built. Other national programmes either use national 
equipments or co-operate with the United States; the British 
programme  is  now  exclusively  one  of satellite  technology, 
and  since  the  cancellation  of  the  Black  Arrow  launcher 
programme,  US  launch vehicles  will  be used. The European multi-national space organisations, ESRO 
(European Space Research Organisation) carries out specific 
space  and  upper-atmosphere  research  using  mainly  Euro-
pean  equipment.  Its  members  are  the  United  Kingdom, 
France, Switzerland,  Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, 
West  Germany  and  Spain.  ELDO,  the  European  Space 
Vehicle Launcher Development Organisation, has produced 
a  medium-weight  launch  rocket,  Europa  1,  at  a  cost  of 
over  $600  million;  it has no real  use,  and is  too  small to 
launch  communications  satellites,  but  a  more  advanced 
version,  Europa  2,  should be  capable  of launching  "Sym-
phonic", the Franco-German communications satellite. 
2.  Wol"ld 
The  US  domestic  market  is,  of  course,  predominantly 
supplied  by  US  manufacturers.  A  small  number  of Euro-
pean airliners  have  been  sold  in the  United States,  mainly 
Caravelles  and  BAC  One-Elevens;  European  business  jets 
have  also sold well-mainly the  Hawker Siddeley  125  and 
the Dassault-Breguet Fan Jet Falcon-and the Fokker F-27 
was  produced in large numbers under licence in the US  by 
Fairchild-Hiller. 
The  only  European  military  aircraft  to  meet  with  any 
success in the  US market since the British Canberra of the 
1950's is  the Hawker Siddeley Harrier VTOL strike fighter; 
this  has  been  sold  in  large  numbers  to  the  US  Marines. 
There  has  been  speculation  that  the  Harrier  will  be  put 
into  production  in  the  US  by  McDonnell  Douglas,  but 
given the current American economic situation, this appears 
unlikely. 
Europe's  exports  to  America's  space  programme  have 
mainly been in the form of qualified and valuable engineers 
and scientists. This hardly represents a benefit to the Euro-
pean aerospace  industry.  Some  hardware has  been  sold  to 
NASA;  British  Aircraft  Corporation  supervised  the  build-
ing  (in  Europe)  of  one  of  the  Intelsat  communications 
satellites  for  the  world  telecommunication  satellite  system. 
In  the  future,  there  may  be  some  direct  US-European 
co-operation on the post-Apollo programme (like  the space 
shuttle) but this is  speculative at present. 
The rest of the world has  been  rather more  receptive  to-
European aerospace products. Airliners like the One-Eleven, 
Caravelle, Fokker F-27 and F-28, Hawker Siddeley 748  and 
Trident  have  sold  abroad,  some  in  very  large  numbers. 
Future products like  the  VFW-Fokker 614  and the  Airbus 
A300B  will  also,  no  doubt,  meet  with  some  success. 
Of military aircraft, Europe produces  one of the world's 
best  selling  jet  fighters,  the  French  Mirage;  since  the  late 
1950's some 2,000 Mirages of all types have been produced, 
and the design  should continue to sell  for some years. The 
British  Aircraft Corporation  Lightning,  a  specialised,  high-
performance,  high-cost  interceptor,  has  not  done  so  well, 
but has made some sales in the Middle East, particularly to 
Saudi  Arabia as  part of a  highly sophisticated  air defence 
system.  There is also a  strong demand from  less  developed 
countries for a  simple, low-cost trainer-cum-attack aircraft, 
and European contenders  for  this  market include the  BAC 
145/167 Strikemaster and Italy's Aermacchi MB326. 
It seems  likely  that the  world's  air  forces  will  continue 
to buy advanced combat aircraft in the future, and Europe's 
.. 
offerings-the Panavia 200,  French Mirage  G8,  and Haw-
ker Siddeley Harrier-can all  be expected  to take  a  share 
of the market. 
Prospects 
Prediction is  never an easy task, especially when  it con-
cerns  a  high-risk  industry like  aerospace.  The past twenty 
years  have  seen  many  predictions  proved  totally  wrong, 
often at very great cost. 
It is likely that the demand for air transport will continue 
to  grow;  Boeing's  optimistic  estimate  is  shown  on  the 
accompanying  graph.  Demand  could  grow  by  less  (or by 
more)  than  Boeing  think  it  will,  and  current  indications 
are  that it will  grow less.  This will  be  bad news  for aero-
space  manufacturers  (and  governments)  who  have  many 
thousands  of millions  of pounds  invested  in a  whole  new 
generation of aeroplanes, ranging from the Boeing 747  and 
the  Concorde  to  the  45-seat  VFW  614  Europe's  main 
ventures--concorde  and  the  A300B  airbus-are  both,  to 
some  extent,  gambles;  sales  estimates  for  Concorde  vary 
from a  mere  14  to over 300;  the A300B  airbus (due to fly 
within  a  year),  has  not  yet  attracted  a  firm  order.  Each 
could fail,  or each could dominate its  share of the airliner 
market for many years  to come. 
The bread-and-butter products, like the BAC One-Eleven, 
HS748,  F-27  and  F-28  should  continue  to  sell,  and  new 
ventures  like  the  Dassault  Mercure,  and,  further  in  the 
future,  quiet  short-take-off  and landing  ventures  could  be 
successful. 
In the military sphere,  two national projects-the French 
Mirage  and  the  British  Harrier VTOL fighter-have  good 
prospects.  The  Panavia  200  is  currently  beset  by  political 
difficulties;  if it survives, it may sell  outside the participat-
ing countries. 
Space and guided weapons should also provide a market, 
but a  limited  one;  simple,  robust guided weapons continue 
to  sell.  The  Intelsat  world  telecommunications  satellite 
system will need components, many of which Europe could 
provide. 
In terms  of resourcefulness  and inventiveness,  the Euro-
pean  aerospace  industry  is  very  well  endowed;  it has  a 
large  home  market which,  shared sensibly  on a  continent-
wide  basis,  could  provide  a  firm  basis  for  much valuable 
export trade. Like so much of modem advanced technology, 
its  future is  bound up with political developments;  given a 
stable political environment, adequate investment and real-
istic  targets,  it  should  win  an  increasing  share  of  the 
world's market. 
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